WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
PTSD presumption

The Minnesota Legislature adopted a statutory presumption, which was effective January 2019, providing that if certain public safety employees are diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), then the disorder shall be presumed to be a work-related occupational disease for the purpose of qualifying for workers’ compensation benefits. A workers’ compensation judge ruled that former Carlton County Deputy Sheriff Douglas Juntunen did not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits, despite having received a diagnosis of PTSD from a licensed psychologist. Instead, the workers’ compensation judge concluded that the competing diagnosis of major depressive disorder that the county’s expert had provided for Juntunen was more credible. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision and sent the case back for additional proceedings, reasoning that the workers’ compensation judge had erred in interpreting and applying the PTSD presumption. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the WCCA’s decision, and ruled that under the plain language of the statutory presumption, “an employee need only present a [PTSD] diagnosis for the presumption to apply, not that the diagnosis is determined by a [workers’] compensation judge to be more credible or persuasive than a competing diagnosis offered by an employer.” The Supreme Court also noted that, once the PTSD presumption attaches, an employer has an opportunity to present “substantial factors” to rebut it. The Supreme Court concluded that Carlton County had failed to rebut the PTSD presumption because its expert’s competing diagnosis “covered a different time period” from when Juntunen was diagnosed with PTSD.

Juntunen v. Carlton County, 982 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2022). Note: The League filed an amicus brief in Carlton County’s support.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES
Statutory Immunity

Metropolitan Council employee Tanisha Brown took her work laptop and some paperwork files home for the weekend. The paper files included health-screening records, and drug and alcohol tests for employees and job applicants. Brown placed the laptop and the files in her car’s trunk, intending to bring them with her to the laundromat so she could do some work while she did her laundry. Before entering the laundromat, Brown parked her car and went into a nearby store. While she was inside, her laptop and files were stolen from her car. The Metropolitan Council’s internal investigation concluded that there were 76 individuals whose health records and personal information had been stolen. Brown’s laptop was encrypted and password protected, and the Metropolitan Council disabled it the morning after the theft. An internal investigation did not reveal that any files had been accessed or retrieved. The laptop and files were never recovered. All potentially affected individuals, including Brenda Lutzke, were given notice of the theft and the opportunity to receive 12 months of credit-monitoring services at the Metropolitan Council’s expense. Lutzke sued the Metropolitan Council, claiming it had been negligent and had violated the Minnesota Health Records Act by releasing her health records without her consent. The district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) in the Metropolitan Council’s favor, concluding that it was entitled to both statutory immunity and vicarious official immunity from Lutzke’s claims. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision in part, concluding that the Metropolitan Council was entitled to statutory immunity. The court of appeals reasoned that the Metropolitan Council’s failure to adopt a policy specifically regulating the safekeeping of confidential information in unattended vehicles was a discretionary, planning-level decision. The court of appeals noted that the Metropolitan Council had general policies in place regarding the storage of information, the protection of that data, and the response to data breaches, and that these policies showed that the Metropolitan Council had balanced safety, financial, and legal considerations when deciding what policies to adopt.

Lutzke v. Metropolitan Council, No. A22-0194 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2022) (nonprecedential opinion).

LAND USE LAW
Comprehensive plan

Under the Metropolitan Land Planning Act, cities in the metropolitan area must create and adopt comprehensive plans. In addition, these cities must review and, if necessary, amend their comprehensive plans at least every 10 years. The Metropolitan Council reviews and may modify proposed comprehensive plans and amendments. In December 2018, the City of Minneapolis scheduled a vote on whether it should adopt and submit its latest comprehensive plan (the 2040 Plan) to the Metropolitan Council for review. A few days before the scheduled vote, Smart Growth Minneapolis, the Audubon Chapter of Minneapolis, and Minnesota Citizens for the Protection of Migratory Birds (collectively, Smart Growth) sued, claiming that the city’s adoption of the 2040 Plan would violate the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). The lawsuit subsequently resulted in two appeals. In the first appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Smart Growth’s lawsuit could proceed against the city because comprehensive plans are not exempt from MERA. On remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) in Smart Growth’s favor on the MERA claim, and it issued an order prohibiting the city from “any ongoing implementation of the 2040 Plan,” and requiring it to “immediately cease all present action in furtherance of the 2040 Plan,” until the city either rebuts Smart Growth’s claim or it prevails in establishing an affirmative defense to the claim, as required under MERA. The city appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court of appeals concluded that the district court had properly based its MERA analysis regarding the potential environmental effects on the presumption of a full build-out of development as authorized under the 2040 Plan. But the court of appeals reversed the district court’s order for injunctive relief and sent the case back with instructions for the district court to make additional findings to support its order for injunctive relief because the existing findings were not adequate for appellate review.

Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, No. A22- 0852 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2022) (nonprecedential opinion). Note: The city has filed a Petition for Review with the Minnesota Supreme Court. 

EMPLOYMENT LAW
First Amendment retaliation

The Police Department for St. Peters, Mo., created a text-messaging group for police officers to update each other about local Black Lives Matter (BLM) protest events. Although the group was intended for this official purpose, officers occasionally shared unrelated content with the group. Officer Brian Bresnahan sent the group a video from an animated sitcom called “Paradise PD.” It showed a Black police officer who accidentally shot himself with a headline stating, “another innocent black man shot by a cop.” Bresnahan claimed that he sent the satirical video because he was critical of the BLM protests. Another officer complained about the video. The next morning, Police Chief Rick Struttman told Bresnahan that he should resign, and said that if he refused to resign, an investigation would be opened, and that Struttman would recommend to the city administrator that Bresnahan be fired. Bresnahan resigned and he subsequently filed a lawsuit against the police chief, the city administrator, and the city under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that the city defendants had retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. The federal district court granted a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, concluding that Bresnahan had failed to state a valid claim for First Amendment retaliation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and sent the case back to the district court for additional proceedings. The court of appeals concluded that Bresnahan had plausibly alleged that he was acting as a citizen when he sent the video, and that his speech involved a matter of public concern, as required to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation. The court of appeals reasoned that, based on the allegations in the complaint, the group text was used to send both work-related and unrelated messages, and Bresnahan’s video was such an unrelated message. The court of appeals also explained that while Bresnahan had met the threshold required to survive the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals was not expressing any opinion about the merits of his claim, and that the district court might later conclude that the city defendants had adequate justification for acting as they did.

Bresnahan v. City of St. Peters: 58 F.4th 381 (8th Cir. 2023).

Written by Susan Naughton, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 281-1232.