ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Requirement for environmental review

Matter of Preparation of Env’t Assessment Worksheet for Proposed Summit Ave. Reg’l Trail, No. A23-1592 (Minn. Ct. App. July 8, 2024) (nonprecedential opinion)

The facts: The City of St. Paul has been planning for the Summit Avenue Regional Trail (SART), which would run along Summit Avenue. SART would create a protected bicycle trail and connect to other regional parks and trails. No funds have been appropriated for SART, and it is not on the city’s construction calendar. Plaintiffs submitted a petition asking the city to prepare an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW), alleging SART would result in destruction of the tree canopy and demolition of a protected historic streetscape. The city denied the request, saying since SART had no funding source, it was not sufficiently definite to be a “project” within the meaning of the rules requiring environmental review.

The type of case: Minnesota law provides for judicial review of a final city or agency decision on the need for an EAW. Environmental review is mandatory when a project meets certain conditions laid out in Minnesota regulations, and “project” is defined as “a governmental action, the results of which would cause physical manipulation of the environment, directly or indirectly.”

The issues: On appeal, the petitioners argued the city had sufficiently finalized SART, requiring environmental review, and that the bicycle trail would have a profound and irreversible adverse environmental impact. They asserted that the city made an error of law in denying the request for an EAW, and that the city made factual findings and legal conclusions that weren’t supported by substantial evidence.

The court’s ruling: The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that SART was not a “project” under the law because the lack of funding made it uncertain the plan would be undertaken. The court also found there was no final SART plan, as there were still options for the trail’s width, a substantial detail. Further, the city had not placed the plan on the construction calendar and had not yet approved a plan. Because of those factors, it was not a project and did not require the city to prepare an EAW.

What this means for cities: If a city receives a petition for an EAW, it should assess whether the plan that is subject of the petition is far enough along to be considered a project under Minnesota law. If the city has neither authorized funding nor finalized the proposed plan, the requirement for environmental review would likely not be triggered.

CIVIL RIGHTS
Immunity from liability

Hunt v. Acosta, 109 F.4th 1003(8th Cir. 2024)

The facts: The plaintiff, Kenneth Hunt, was scheduled to testify as a witness in a criminal case. As the case was not going to be called until later, he was directed out of the courtroom. After sitting in the courthouse, Hunt got up to seek out the chief judge. A Marianna, Arkansas, police officer, Dale Acosta, told Hunt to stay out of the courtroom. Hunt said he understood and began to walk away. Acosta stopped Hunt, saying, “You finish when I finish.” After Hunt retorted that Acosta couldn’t tell him when he was finished, Acosta threatened to arrest Hunt for obstruction. Acosta also told Hunt if he had court business, he needed to have a seat. Hunt explained he had other business and asked if the chief judge was in. Acosta said he was, but if Hunt was not in the courtroom when his case was called, a bench warrant would be issued. Acosta instructed Hunt to sit down, and Hunt asked if he was under arrest. Acosta said, “You are now,” and ordered another officer to arrest Hunt for obstruction.

The type of case: Hunt alleged Acosta violated his civil rights by arresting him for obstruction without probable cause. Hunt also named Police Chief Martin Wilson and Mayor Jimmie Earl Williams, saying they failed to properly train or supervise Acosta. The lower court ruled Hunt could proceed on his Fourth Amendment claim against Acosta and his failure to train or supervise claim against Wilson and Williams. All three appealed.

The issues: On appeal, Acosta argued he was shielded from liability under quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity. Quasi-judicial immunity protects officials and employees who, as part of their official duties, exercise discretion similar to that of a judge. Qualified immunity protects city officials and employees, unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right. Wilson and Williams argued they were not liable for failure to train because Acosta had not shown a pattern of unconstitutional acts.

The court’s ruling: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held Acosta was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his initial stop of Hunt. But after Hunt told Acosta he was going to talk to the chief judge, Acosta knew Hunt had other business in the courthouse, so Acosta’s subsequent actions were not protected. Regarding qualified immunity, Acosta argued he had a reasonable belief the arrest was appropriate because his confrontation with Hunt occurred outside an office, which disrupted employees. In rejecting this, the appellate court said there was no evidence showing disruption and no reasonable person would believe probable cause existed to arrest Hunt over a mere distraction. The appellate court dismissed the failure to train claim against Wilson and Williams, saying the single incident of Acosta’s misconduct was not enough to give notice of a pattern and that other cases against the department about entirely different conduct were irrelevant. The case was returned to the lower court to allow the Fourth Amendment claim to proceed against Acosta only.

What this means for cities: Officials and employees must be aware that creating a distraction alone cannot form the basis for an arrest for obstruction if there is no evidence the arrestee hindered any governmental functions. Cities will likely prevail against an allegation of a failure to train or supervise if there is only a single incident of misconduct.

ELECTION LAW
Taxpayer standing to challenge law

Minnesota Voters Alliance. v. Hunt, 10 N.W.3d 163 (Minn. 2024)

The facts: In 2023, Minnesota passed the Re-Enfranchisement Act, which restored the right to vote for people with felony convictions as long as they are not currently incarcerated for the offense. The Legislature appropriated funds for the Secretary of State to implement the law and develop an educational campaign about the restoration of voting rights. A group of taxpayers and the association to which they belong, the Minnesota Voters Alliance, sued, saying the statute was unconstitutional and that spending public funds to educate people about the provision was unlawful.

The type of case: The plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment, which asks the court to clarify the application or validity of a law. The lower court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the Re-Enfranchisement Act and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed.

The issues: On appeal, the plaintiffs contended they had taxpayer standing to bring the lawsuit. Generally, a plaintiff must show they suffered a direct injury from a law they are challenging, rather than just disagreeing with the law. An exception is taxpayer standing, where taxpayers allege the government is illegally spending public funds under a particular law.

The court’s ruling: The Minnesota Supreme Court held the subject of the plaintiffs’ challenge was the Re-Enfranchisement Act, which restores voting rights to formerly incarcerated people but contains no language requiring any government spending. The court noted the act was enforceable even if the Legislature had not appropriated money to educate people about voting eligibility. Because of that, any allegation by the plaintiffs that the government was unlawfully spending public funds was incidental, not central, to their attempt to invalidate the law. The court held that taxpayer standing is permissible only when allegations of unlawful spending are central to the lawsuit. If taxpayers were allowed to bring suits based on incidental expenditures, the court said, it would render the concept of taxpayer standing meaningless because nearly every law requires some sort of public expenditure.

What this means for cities: The decision clarifies the scope of taxpayer standing, making clear that a taxpayer challenge to a city ordinance must show the challenged ordinance itself authorizes the unlawful spending of public funds. A taxpayer cannot manufacture standing by pointing to expenditures that are merely incidental to implementing the law they are challenging.

Written by Lisa Needham, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 281-1271.