CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Eighth Amendment

City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson, No. 23-175 (U.S. June 28, 2024)

The facts: Grants Pass, Oregon, a city of 38,000 people, has approximately 600 people who are unhoused on any given day. Beginning in 2013, the city increased enforcement of existing ordinances banning camping in public places. The city’s ordinance defined “camping” as “any place where bedding, sleeping bag[s], or other material used for bedding purposes, or any stove or fire is placed … for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live.” Violation of the ordinances result in increasing penalties, beginning with fines, escalating to an order barring the individual from city parks, and then to criminal trespass.

The type of case: The plaintiffs, unhoused individuals, brought a class action lawsuit arguing the ordinances were unconstitutional. Imposing criminal penalties on unhoused people for sleeping outdoors when no indoor shelter is available, they contended, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, they said camping ordinances made being unhoused a crime, rather than applying to actions taken by unhoused people. The plaintiffs prevailed at the lower federal district court and at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The lower court found that unhoused individuals in Grants Pass were “involuntarily” homeless because the unhoused population exceeds the number of shelter beds.

The issues: The city asked the United States Supreme Court to hear the case, saying the ordinances did not target unhoused people or make it a crime to be unhoused, but rather were generally applicable camping ordinances. The city also contended it was difficult to determine whether an individual was “involuntarily” unhoused.

The court’s ruling: The Court reversed, holding the ordinances did not criminalize being unhoused, but instead criminalized the act of choosing to sleep outside. The Court also ruled the punishments under the ordinances were not cruel and unusual, as penalties were relatively minor and similar punishments exist across the country. Finally, the majority found communities need flexibility to address issues of homelessness at the local level.

What this means for cities: Cities can pass ordinances (or enforce existing ones) that criminalize sleeping outdoors in public spaces, even if the city does not have adequate shelter beds. However, cities cannot target such ordinances at unhoused individuals specifically, but rather must pass laws that apply equally to everyone.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Scope of authority of administrative law judge

City of Eden Prairie v. Serafin, 7 N.W.3d 132 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024)

The facts: Travis Serafin was employed as a police officer by the City of Eden Prairie from 2000 to 2018, when the city terminated him over allegations of misconduct. Serafin was reinstated by an arbitrator, and the city moved to vacate the arbitration award. In 2021, the parties reached a separation agreement. Serafin agreed to settle all claims and the city agreed to pay Serafin a fixed amount that included Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) contributions. In 2022, PERA informed the city that Serafin had applied for duty disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), it had approved the application, and the city was responsible for continued health insurance coverage.

The type of case: The city petitioned for a contested case hearing under Minnesota Statutes, section 299A.465, which covers continuation of health care coverage when an officer is disabled in the line of duty. Before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the city argued the separation agreement cleared the city of that obligation but did not contest whether Serafin was entitled to duty disability benefits generally. The ALJ agreed with the city, saying Serafin waived all rights to continuation of coverage in the separation agreement.

The issues: Serafin petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals to review the ALJ decision, arguing the ALJ did not have the authority to determine whether someone contractually agreed to waive a claim for health insurance coverage.

The court’s ruling: The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, saying the ALJ exceeded its statutory authority when it determined whether a claim to continued health insurance had been waived. Administrative law judges only have the authority granted in statute, but the statute states only that after an officer is eligible for duty disability benefits, the officer’s employer “shall” continue to provide health coverage.

What this means for cities: Cities cannot ask an ALJ to assess whether a duty-disabled officer has waived a claim to continued health insurance. Either party could have asked the district court, rather than the ALJ, to address the matter, but the language of the statute still seems to require employers to contribute to health coverage even in that instance.

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Discretionary acts

Honcik v. Norman Cnty., No. A23-1821 (Minn. Ct. App. July 1, 2024) (nonprecedential opinion)

The facts: In February 2022, a snowplow driver for Norman County, Justin Wilhelm, was clearing snowdrifts for the county. When Wilhelm approached an intersection, he saw a snowdrift just past the intersection and decided to go through the intersection without stopping with the plow blade down to clear the drift. Wilhelm did not see the car of the plaintiff, James Honcik. Honcik’s car hit the snowplow and he was injured.

The type of case: Honcik filed a lawsuit against Norman County, stating Wilhelm was negligent in operating the snowplow. (The claim and court resolution are the same as if the lawsuit was brought against a city.) The county moved for summary judgment (a court-ordered judgment without a trial), asserting official immunity because Wilhelm was engaged in a discretionary act. Discretionary acts involve an exercise of individual professional judgment reflecting the factors of a situation. The district court agreed with the county and Honcik appealed.

The issues: Honcik asserted official immunity only protects snowplow drivers when they are actively removing snow and drivers are not exempt from traffic statutes otherwise. Wilhelm was therefore required to stop for the stop sign and not doing so was negligent.

The court’s ruling: The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court ruling. Wilhelm testified his decision to go through the intersection was to effectively plow a snowdrift. He was actively considering weather conditions and other factors. Moreover, Norman County gave snowplow drivers broad discretion and did not require drivers to follow traffic statutes.

What this means for cities: Cities should review the discretion given to snowplow drivers, including whether they are required to follow traffic statutes. A protocol that authorizes drivers to exercise professional judgment in determining the best methods to clear snow will create a discretionary duty, while one that rigidly controls a driver’s actions likely would not.

FREE SPEECH
First Amendment

Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa, 102 F.4th 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2024)

The facts: Street Fest, a commercial event that drew thousands, was conducted subject to the city’s approval and permitting process. The festival area was fenced in, and vendors were required to contract with event organizers. Cory Sessler, a street preacher, entered the restricted area and shared a religious message amplified by loudspeakers. Sessler’s group relocated at the request of police, but the new location led to issues with vendors as Sessler’s group was telling people they were going to hell and customers took offense. Sessler’s group was again relocated, this time outside the fenced-in area, where they preached for an additional two hours.

The type of case: Sessler brought a Section 1983 action against the city, saying the city violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise. The lower court granted summary judgment to the city and Sessler appealed.

The issues: Sessler contended his First Amendment rights were violated when his group was asked to leave the fenced-in area because of complaints from vendors and customers. Sessler alleged this was a “heckler’s veto,” where police silence a speaker to prevent violent backlash from others. Government restrictions on speech generally must be content-neutral and cannot be based on issues with the speaker or their speech. Sessler alleged he was asked to move because of the content of his speech.

The court’s ruling: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court, saying the city’s restrictions were content-neutral and reasonable. Police worked with Sessler to find an acceptable alternative location, the issue was the volume and disruption of Sessler’s speech, not the content, and Sessler was allowed to continue to preach to large crowds outside the fence.

What this means for cities: Cities should ensure that any restrictions on speech are not targeted at content. Restrictions that address the volume and disruption levels of speakers are permissible. In the event a city chooses to relocate individuals engaging in speech, it should ensure they continue to have a space to share their message without causing undue disruption.

Written by Lisa Needham, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 281-1271.